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indigents' Dissatisfaction with Assigned Counsel
T HE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY embraces the principle that
the basic interests of society are endangered when the rights
of an individual are diminished.1 The indigent's dissatisfaction with
his assigned counsel is relevant only because Americans presuppose
that a criminal prosecution unaccompanied by the panoply of the
adversary process is a deprivation of the fundamental rights of the
accused. This concept of justice obligates a government which insti-
tutes criminal prosecutions to provide representation for those unable
to afford their own counsel.2 It further imposes a duty to assure
effective counsel in order to preserve the element of challenge which
is the very nucleus of the adversary system.
The General Rule - Effective Assistance of Counsel
The judicial assumption that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is a right to effective counsel originated with the decision in
Powell v. Alabama3 where the trial judge's appointment of the
entire bar to represent the Scotsboro boys was deemed a failure to
make an effective appointment and therefore a denial of due process.
Mitchell v. United States4 interpreted Powell's use of the term "effec-
tive" to describe a procedural requirement rather than a standard
of skill and held that it is not part of the judge's function to
evaluate the relative proficiency of the lawyer's trial performance.
It was alleged that such action would destroy the concept of an
impartial judge and deprive the accused of his right to counsel's
selection of tactical trial methods.5 Better reasoned cases have re-
jected this procedural limitation and have held that the right to
effective representation is substantive and not merely formal,' thus
imposing on the courts the duty of evaluating at least to some min-
imal degree the quality of representation provided in the judicial
process.
The liberalizing trend of the 1960's extending the rights of the
accused in criminal prosecutions' and lessening the requirements for
I Hayes, Common Feliacics in Critici of Recent Court Decisions on Rights of the Acce sed,
53 A.B.A.J. 425, 426 (1967).
1 ATT'Y GEN. COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND TUE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUsTicr, REPORT at 9-11 (1963),
3287 U.S. 45 (1932) [hereinafter Powell].
4259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
'Id. at 793.
'Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940);
Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967); Johnson v. United States, 110 F.2d 562
(D.C. Cit. t940).
'United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to counsel during police line-up);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to counsel during police interrogations);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (exclusion of confession taken without advising
(Continued on next page)
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federal review of state convictions' encouraged many states to enact
comparable procedures for review of state convictions.' The result
has been that both federal and state courts have been inundated with
petitions for post-conviction relief, many of which assert unsubstan-
tiated and frivolous allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. 1
The Court's reluctance to set standards whereby the quality of
representation may be tested and its insistence that each case be de-
termined on an ad hoe basis' from the totality of the circumstances12
has permitted, if not encouraged, the multitude of petitions which
strain both the vaunted judicial patience 13 as well as its budget.14
The predictable result has been a demand for a limitation upon in-
terminable review 5 and for a procedure which, while providing ready
access to the appeals court, would also quickly dispose of cases lack-
ing in merit.16
The problem has become more urgent with the recent decision
in Argersinger v. Hamlini" which extended the right to assigned
counsel to misdemeanor cases where the penalty may be imprison-
ment. The inevitable increase in assignments of counsel which will
result and the concomitant petitions for dismissal of counsel or
for post-conviction relief based on ineffective representation re-
quire a reappraisal of the court's imprecise definition of effective
representation.
(Continued from preceding page)
suspect of his rights); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (tight to a hearing on issue
of voluntatiness of confession); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against
self-incrimination extended); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 39 (1963) (exhaustion of state
remedies doctrine liberalized in habeas corpus actions); Mapp v, Ohio, 367 U S. 643
(1961) (exclusion of illegally seized evidence).
828 U.S.C. §§2255, 2244 (1948).
9 For a study of state post-conviction statutes enacted to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§§2255, 2244 see Swindler, State Post.Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus
(pts. 1-5) 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 149, 159, 171, 183, 225 (1970).
l0S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1968).
1 Bruffett v. State, 208 Kan. 942, 494 P.2d 1160 (1972); Witt v. State, 475 S.W.2d 259
(Tex. Cr. App. 1971); State v. Lindsey, 53 Wis.2d 759, 193 N.W.2d 699 (1972).
12Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964); Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166 (W.D.
Mo. 1968); Abraham v. State, 228 Ind. 179, 91 N.E.2d 358 (1950).
'3 Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313 (1948).
1" Interview with John J. Lavelle, Administrator, The Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, in Cleveland, Ohio, on July 26, 1972. Mr. Lavelle indicated that in 1972 the
number of law clerks employed by the court increased from sever to a total of fifteen. The
law clerks' primary responsibility is to research the record when a petition for post-conviction
relief is received by the court. Each application requires three to four hours of review to
determine its validity.
sSimpson v. State, 211 So.2d 862 (Fla. App. 1968). See also Habeas Corpus-an Erosion
of Law and Order? 14 CATHOLIC L. 293 (1968).
6 Frivoloas Appeals and the Minimum Standards Project; Solution or Surrender?, 24 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 95, 102 (1969).
1792 S.Ct. 2006 (1972). The court reasoned that the common-law right to counsel limited
to misdemeanor and petty offense cases was extended but not supplanted by the Sixth
Amendment.
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The Court has described effective representation in negative
terms, requiring that the trial be "a sham, a farce, a mockery of
justice,"18 "shocking to the conscience of the court and lacking in
fundamental fairness"19 or that the representation be "so horribly
inept as to constitute virtually no representation at all"2 0 before a
lack of effective assistance of counsel may be found. The task of
providing more illuminating guidelines than these broad and amor-
phous terms has been delegated to the lower federal courts. This
challenge has been met with varying degrees of specificity and a
regrettable lack of uniformity.
Interpretations of "Effective Assistance"
One standard for determining whether representation which is
constitutionally adequate supports a finding of effective representa-
tion whenever it is determined that trial counsel's actions had any
reasonable basis, regardless of the existene of more reasonable
alternatives. A second test, that of "normal competency," requires
only that there be no failure to present the case in any fundamental
respect 2 and holds that lack of diligence is not necessarily equated
with ineffective assistance of counsel.Y Theorizing that the constitu-
tional right to effective assistance of counsel does not entitle an
indigent to be defended by a lawyer whose skill meets any specified
aptitude test, 4 reviewing courts have been exceptionally undemand-
ing in their expectations of normal competence.
The only standard employed in which courts have indicated a
willingness to take more than a cursory look at trial performance
is that which requires counsel both "reasonably likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance." This standard demands
"
t United States v. Roche, 443 F.2d 98 (10th Cit. 1971); Bruner v. United States, 432 F.2d
931 (10th Cit. 1970); Scott v. United States, 334 F.2d 72 (6th Cit. 1964); Jones v. Huff,
152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Goforth v. United States, 314 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 812 (1963); Harper v. Wainwright, 334 F. Supp. 1338 (M.D. Fla
1971); State v. Thornton, 108 Ari2. 119, 493 P.2d 902 (1972); People v. Flanigan, 49
1112d 321, 274 N.E.2d 75 (1971).
19 United States ex rei. Maselli v. Reincke, 383 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1967); accord, Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); United States ex rel. Boucher v. Reincke, 341 F.2d 977
(2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Benevena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963).
2'United States v. Radford, 452 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1971); Wilcoxon v. Aldredge, 192 Ga.
634, 15 S.E.2d 873 (1941), noted in 146 A.L.R. 365; Bies v. State, 53 Wis.2d 322, 193
NW.2d 46 (1972).
21 Pennington v. Beto, 437 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1971); Pineda v. Bailey, 340 F.2d 162 (5th
Cit. 1965); United States ex rel. Bolden v. Rundle, 300 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Givens v. Dutton, 222 Ga. 756, 152 S.E2d 358 (1966); Commonwealth ex ,el. Washing-
ton v. Maroney, 427 Pa 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
"State v. Sinclair, 236 A.2d 66 (Me. 1967); McQueen v. State, 475 S.W.2d 111 (Mo.
1971); State v. Anderson, 117 N.J. Super. 507. 285 A.2d 234 (1971).
23Cardatella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967);
cf. State v. Newton, 1 Or. App. 376, 462 P.2d 696 (1969).
4 Frand v. United States, 301 P.2d 102, 103 (10th Cit. 1962).
"Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); Pineda v. Bailey, 340 F.2d 162 (5th Cir.
1965); Bentley v. State, 285 F. Supp. 498 (S.D. Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960
(1970).
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actual and substantial assistance and something more than mere
pro forma representation.2 6 Although this test is also very tolerant
of an attorney's transgressions, it appears to offer the greatest hope
of relief to a post-conviction petitioner. The guidelines have been
expressed in Smotherman v. Beto as follows:
Defense attorneys are called upon to apply their knowl-
edge, experience and talents to a given set of facts and to
derive from such fusion a defense which the Sixth Amend-
ment requires to be adequate, not miraculous. When the
adequacy of a defense rendered by an attorney is subject
to attack, the relevant consideration is . . . whether . . .
his representation failed to render reasonably effective
assistance to the accused."
The Duty of the Court
The right of the indigent to the effective assistance of counsel
imposes a duty on the court to appoint counsel capable of providing
such assistance, and the incompetence of the lawyer is sometimes
imputed to the trial judge." A lawyer is expected to refuse to handle
a legal matter in which he is not competent,9 but where an assigned
attorney insisted that his lack of experience in criminal matters
rendered him incompetent to defend the accused, the trial court's
refusal to dismiss him was upheld as the record did not show ineffec-
tive representation. 30 Although a rotation system of appointment has
been upheld on the theory that the Constitution does not guarantee
each indigent that only a leader of the bar will speak for him, 1 it
has also been asserted that the court has a duty to assign counsel
with sufficient ability and experience to fairly represent the accused
and to protect his rights? 2 In jurisdictions where there is no dearth
of lawyers experienced in criminal trials, the practice is to assign
only the most skillful lawyers.3 The indigent is thus provided with
a defense which only a wealthy defendant or the state could afford.
26 MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 601 (5th Cit. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cit.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961); accord, People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 280
N.E.2d 637, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1972).
2?276 F. Supp. 579, 586 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Bentley v. State, 285 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.
Fln. 1968), cert. denied, 396 US. 960 (1970).
29 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, DR 6- 101 (A) (1) (1969).
3)State v. Riley, 394 S.W.2d 360 (Mo. 1965).
31State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 402, 217 A.2d 441, 444 (1966),noted in 21 A.L.R.3d 804;
accord, Calhoun v. United States, 454 F.2d 702 (7th Cit. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 1302
(1972).
'State v. Frazier, 280 N.C. 181, 185 S.E.2d 652 (1972); State v. Rushford, 127 Vt. 105,
241 A.2d 306 (1968). See generally Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and
investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 632 (1970);
Right to Adequate Representation in the Criminal Process: Some Observations, 22 Sw.
L. J. 260 (1968).
33 Interview, Lavelle, supra note 14.
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An effective appointment implies that the lawyer shall be given
sufficient time to confer with his client, investigate, and prepare a
defense. It has been held, therefore, that a late appointment of coun-
sel is inherently prejudicial and a deprivation of effective assistance
of counsel.3 4 Although mere formal appointment does not satisfy the
Constitutional mandate, in determining whether a late appointment
has deprived defendant of effective representation, the relative com-
plexity of the case, the prior experience of the lawyer, and whether
or not additional time would have appreciably benefited the defense
will be considered.35 Thus, one day, or even a few minutes, has been
held sufficient time to confer with a client and prepare an effective
defense. 6
Pre-Trial Remedies
Prior to trial the indigent who is dissatisfied with his assigned
counsel will discover that his remedies are subject to the sound dis-
cretion of the court.3' When the court calendar is not threatened
with disruption, substitute counsel is often appointed upon a sincere,
although not necessarily valid, expression of dissatisfaction;38 but
it is the court and not the indigent who selects the counsel to be
assigned." Moreover, the indigent must allege a more valid com-
plaint than a lack of rapport before a denial of his request for sub-
stitute counsel reaches the level of deprivation of a constitutional
right.40 In this regard it has been held that a language barrier be-
tween the indigent and his assigned counsel is not such a lack of
communication as to deprive the indigent of his right to effective
assistance of counsel.4 Even where his assigned lawyer had charged
14 Martin v. Virginia, 365 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966); Rastrom v. Robbins, 319 F. Supp, 1090
(S.D. Me. 1970); ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSE-
CUTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. §4.1 (Approved Draft 1971).
3
5 Fowler v. Powell, 336 F. Supp. 276 (W.D. Pa. 1972); State v. Anderson, 117 NJ. Super.
507, 285 A.2d 234 (1971); Commonwealth v. Woody, 440 Pa. 569, 271 A.2d 477 (1970).
31 Goforth v. United States, 314 F.2d 868 (10th Cit. 1963) cart. denied 374 U.S. 812 (1963)
(a few minutes suficient where lawyer took active part in the trial); Commonwealth v.
Russell, 428 Pa. 440, 239 A.2d 399 (1968) (one day sufficient where defendant admitted
guilt).
37United States v. White, 451 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1971); United States ex el. Davis v.
McMann, 386 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1968); Good v.
United States, 378 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Ellenbogen, 365 F.2d 982
(2d Cit. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 923 (1967); State v. Miller, I Or. App. 460, 460
P.2d 874 (1969).
38 Interview, Lavelle, supra note 14.
39 Fugate v. Gaffney, 453 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1971); Lee v. Crouse, 284 F. Supp. 541 (D
Kan. 1967); People v. Tolbert, 70 Cal.2d 790, 452 P.2d 661, 76 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1969);
People v. Hughes, 57 Cal.2d 89, 367 P.2d 33, 17 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1961); State v. Frazier,
280 N.C. 181, 185 S..2d 652 (1972).
41 Lamoureux v. Massachusetts, 412 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1969); State v. Johnson, 257 So.2d
654 (La. 1972); Weeks v. State, 476 S.W. 2d 310 (Tex. Cr. App. 1972).
4' United States v. Valensuela-Mendoza, 452 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1971).
1973]
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defendant with theft, there was not sufficient hostility to destroy the
attorney-client relationship and produce ineffective representation.42
The most common complaint of indigents awaiting trial is that
their lawyer rarely visits them in jail. Indigents sometimes interpret
the lawyer's duty to represent a client "exclusive of all others" as
entitling them to full-time attention; whereas the lawyer interprets
this as a duty to represent the client exclusive of those who have
conflicting interests.4 3 The Public Defender program has been highly
praised for the good public relations it has maintained through fre-
quent client consultations," a feat greatly simplified by its specialized
practice. The economy of time resulting from a public defender's
ability to move from cell to cell is analogous to the efficiency demon-
strated by a physician in making his hospital rounds. Yet indigents
often complain that their public defender has little time for them
because of his heavy case load.4 5 A Public Defender explains the
source of the dissatisfaction:
The indigent feels that his lawyer's duty to counsel
extends to all areas in which he has difficulties. We're pre
pared for our cases but we can't afford the luxury of
reassurance.4 6
In instances where a guilty plea is entered, the indigent has a
fertile field for alleging faulty representation by his assigned counsel
as it is a lawyer's duty to advise his client as to the probable penalty
and legal consequences accruing from a guilty plea. There is no
record to refute the indigent's allegations, and perjury presents little
threat to one already in prison. The unwary lawyer may find him-
self subjected to the most libelous attacks in a trial where he has
become the accused.4 9 The indigent has little to gain other than the
ego-satisfaction of this role reversal, as courts consistently find that
an attack upon the credibility and reputation of a fellow member of
42Gray v. State, 475 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Cr. App. 1971).
43United States v. Pine, 452 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1971); see Estep v. State, 14 Md. App. 53,
286 A.2d 187 (1972); ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, EC 5- (1969).
Interview with Hon. Frank J. Gorman, Judge of The Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, in Cleveland, Ohio on July 27, 1972.
15State v- Green, 161 Conn. 291, 287 A.2d 386 (1971); see Hawk v. Hann, 103 F. Supp.
138 (D. Neb. 1952),rev'd on other grounds 205 F.2d 839 (8th Cit. 1953).
6 Interview with Harry E. Youtt, Director of the Criminal Division, Legal Aid Society of
Cleveland, in Cleveland, Ohio, on July 24, 1972.
"
t Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255 (8th Cit. 1971); State v. Morrow, 108 Ariz.
108, 493 P.26 119 (1972); In re Watson, 6 Cal3a 831, 494 P.2d 1264, 100 Cal. Rptr.
720 (1972); Commonwealth v. Studenroth, 430 Pa. 425, 243 A.2d 352, cert denied, 393
U.S. 1007 (1968).
At ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, EC 7- 5, EC 7-8 (1969).
"United States v. Barcley, 452 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1971); Ameen v. State, 51 Wis.2d 175,
186 N.W.2d 206 (1971). See generally Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus- A Hindsight
Viewv of Trial Attorney Effectiveness, 27 LA. L. REv. 784 (1967).
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the bar is repugnant.50 A plea in reliance on his lawyer's mistaken
advice does not entitle the defendant to have the plea and judgment
set aside even though he faces a long prison term rather than the ex-
pected probation. 1 It has been suggested that conducting plea bar-
gaining in the presence of the defendant and making it part of the
record would make a claim of inadequate representation impossible.
This reasoning is criticized on the ground that: "This practice would
seriously inhibit the free exchange of evidence which makes plea
bargaining an effective and meaningful tool for both the prosecution
and the defense.
' 53
As the day set for trial approaches, the trial judge often takes
a jaundiced view of any expression of dissatisfaction with counsel,
deeming it a delaying tactic.5 4 However, even the most unjustified
grumbling by the indigent defendant imposes a duty upon the court
to hold a hearing and investigate the charge. A failure to determine
the legitimacy or capriciousness of the complaint is ground for re-
versal of a conviction even though the record does not support a
charge of incompetency.55 Where the complaint is found to be legiti-
mate in the considered reflection of the reviewing court, the trial
judge's necessarily immediate decision to deny substitute counsel will
be considered an abuse of discretion. 6 Permitting substitute counsel
but denying a continuance may also be held to be an abuse of dis-
cretion,57 as "[a] myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face
of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with
counsel an empty formality,""
A trial court more lenient in granting substitute counsel and a
continuance to prepare the defense may find itself subsequently con-
fronted with the assertion that the accused has been denied his
'United States v. Delia, 353 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1965); O'Neill v. Tahash, 324 F2d 1s
(8th Cir. 1963); cf. United States v. Horton, 334 F.2d 153 (2d Cir, 1964).
5 Harris v. United States, 434 F.2d 23 (9th Cit. 1970); Is re Croft, 145 Cal. App.2d 155,
302 P.2d 61 (1956); People v. Thomas, 51 111.2d 39, 280 N.E.2d 433 (1972); People v.
Story, 3 Ill. App.3d 120, 278 N.E.2d 457 ( 1971); Commonwealth 6x rel. Crosby v. Rundle,
415 Pa. 81, 202 A.2d 299 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 976 (1965); Quinn. v. State, 53
Wis.2d 821, 193 N.W.2d 665 (1972).
52 Interview with Roger Hurley, Assistant Legal Aid Defender, Legal Aid Society of Cleveland,
in Cleveland, Ohio, on July 24, 1972.
53 Interview with Hon. John T. Patton, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, in Cleveland, Ohio, on July 28, 1972.
"
4United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967); Com-
monwealth v. Scott, 277 N.E.2d 483 (Mass. 1971).
"
5State v Deal, 17 Ohio St-2a 17, 244 N.E.2d 742 (1969).
"
tPeople v. Moss, 253 Cal. App.2d 248, 61 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1967); People v. Williams, 386
Mich. 565, 194 N.W.2d 337 (1972); cf, United States v. Lisk, 454 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.
1972).
"RReynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961); People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal.2d 199, 417 P.2d
868, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966). Bat cf State v. Butch, 261 La. 3, 258 So.2d 861 (1972).
"Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964); acrord, Chandler v. Frerag, 348 U.S. 3
(1954).
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right to a speedy trial.5 9 Theorizing that it is the accused who benefits
from a delay in the trial, the reviewing court usually concludes that
the defendant has impliedly waived this right by his request for
substitute counsel.60 In effect, the defendant must elect between two
constitutional rights although the Sixth Amendment gives no indi-
cation that these are conditional or alternative rights.
Remedies at Trial
An indigent so remiss as to become dissatisfied with his assigned
counsel belatedly will find his remedies sharply curtailed. He may
continue with counsel, proceed with his own defense, or retain other
counsel at his own expense." The availability of the last alterna-
tive would appear to suggest that the determination of his indigency
may have been inaccurate. The right of the accused to act as his own
lawyer is unqualified if invoked prior to trial, but the court has no
duty to inform him of this right.6' Further, if the defendant first
expresses his desire to exercise the right to defend himself during
the course of the trial, he may do so only upon the court's determina-
tion that he his competent to represent himself.63
Although the trial judge has no obligation to conduct the de-
fense," it is his duty to supervise the proceedings so as to assure the
defendant a fair trial with competent representation. In an attempt
to compensate for inadequate representation, the court may inter-
vene to the extent of instructing counsel in chambers, denying or
granting motions, questioning witnesses, removing the case from the
jury, declaring a mistrial or granting a new trial on its own motion.
S9 Michel v. Louisiana, 350 US. 91 (1955); People v. Johnson, 45 Il.2d 38, 257 N.E.2d 3
(1970); Hall v. State, 3 Md. App. 680, 240 A.2d 630 (1968).
6People v. Jones, 130 It. App. 769, 266 N.E.2d 411 (1971); Raburn v. Nash, 78 N.M.
385, 431 P.2d 874 (1967); State v. Jackson, 228 Or. 371, 365 P.2d 294 (1961), noted in
89 A.L.R,2d 1225.
11 United States v. Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1945); People v. Maddox, 67 Cal.2d
647, 433 P.2d 163, 63 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1967); State v. Boudoin, 257 La. 583, 243 So.2d
265 (1971); Peters v. State, 139 Mont. 634, 366 P.2d 158 (1961); State v. Reed, 188
Neb. 195, 195 N.W.2d 503 (1972).
62 United States v. White, 429 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Jackson v.
Follette, 425 F.2d 257 (2d Cit. 1970); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348
F.2d 12 (2d Cit. 1965). But cl. Cleveland v. Whipkey, 29 Ohio App.2d 79, 278 N.E.2d
374 (1972).
3 People v, Durham, 70 Cal.2d 171, 449 P.2d 198, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262, cert. denied, 395 U.S.
968 (1969); People v. Newton, 238 Cal. App.2d 572, 65 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1968); see
United States ex cel. Pugach v. Mancusi, 310 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. N.Y. 1974), cert, denied,
404 U.S. 849 (1971); In re Johnson, 62 Cal.2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1965).
" People v. Cooger, 71 Cal.2d 153, 454 P.2d 686, 77 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1969); see King v.
United States, 355 F.2d 700 (1st Cir. 1966); United States ex el. Ellington v. Conboy,
333 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D. N.Y. 1971); People v. White, 25 Mich. App. 176, 181 N.W.2d
56 (1970).
65 Smith v. Superioz Court, 68 Cal.2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968) (dictum);
accord, People v. Bailey, 76 Il. App.2d 310, 222 N.E,2d 268 (1966); see People v. Foster,
377 Mich. 233, 140 N.W.2d 513 (1966); People v. Crawford, 16 Mich. App. 92, 167
N.W.2d 814 (1969).
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However, a mistrial based on the trial judge's subjective opinion that
counsel is incompetent is considered beyond the power of the court
and an abuse which threatens the independence of the bar.6
Equipped only with an ambiguous set of standards and conflict-
ing decisions interpreting the validity of the indigent's dissatisfac-
tion with assigned counsel, the trial court judge has the burden of
making a decision which may be subject to concerted attack on
review. He is expected to balance public interests and private rights
while weighing assertions of dissatisfaction which are often incapa-
ble of accurate measurement. The standard for review of a trial
judge's alleged abuse of discretion as stated in Spalding v. Spalding"
may be of some comfort to trial judges, although its application in-
variably precludes relief for the defendant.
[An] abuse of discretion involves far more than a dif-
ference in judicial opinion between the trial and appellate
courts. The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice,
... of a determination made between competing considera-
tions. In order to have an "abuse" in reaching such deter-
mination, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative
of fact and logic that it evidences ... not the exercise of
reason but rather of passion or bias.61
Post-Trial Remedies
Often it is only during the contemplation customarily supplied
by the penitentiary environment that the indigent reviews the se-
quence of events that resulted in his confinement and concludes that
his conviction ensued from counsel's dereliction of duty. It has been
judicially declared that a convicted defendant is entitled to relief
upon a showing of a lack of effective assistance of counsel. An
avenue of escape apparently so promising could not fail to result in
a flood of petitions asserting incompetent counsel. Faced with a
dilemma of its own making, the court has devised such rigid require-
ments for proof of a denial of effective representation that relief has
little chance of becoming an actuality for the convicted indigent. As
Justice Clark cautioned in his dissenting opinion in Fay v. Noia:
"... each defeat in that struggle (for law and order) chips away in-
exorably at the base of that very personal liberty which it seeks to
protect."' 9
"6Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
7 5355 Mich. 382, 94 N.W.2d 810 (1959).
11Id. at 384-85, 94 N.W.2d at 811-12.
69 372 U.S. 391, 447 (1963) (dissenting opinion). See also Miller, Balancing the Rights of
the Accused and the Public, 53 A.B.A.J. 1046 (1967).
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It is a truism to all except the convicted indigent that success
cannot be equated with effective assistance of counsel, as neither
vigor nor skill can overcome truth. 7 The evidence of his guilt is
irrelevant to the accused whose sole standard of effective assistance
of counsel is the lawyer who obtains his acquittal. Judge Herbert R.
Whiting wryly commented:
Rationally or not, the indigent defendant feels he has
been denied a fundamental right when his lawyer refuses
to fabricate for him. He fails to realize that subornation of
perjury is a luxury in which only the affluent criminal can
indulge.
1
As there is a presumption of competency of court-appointed
counsel, the petitioner for post-conviction relief has a heavy burden
of proof to show actual incompetence." The petitioner must allege
particular facts showing the inadequacy of the representation; gen-
eralized conclusions of incompetency will not even entitle him to a
hearing. 3 Thus, even though assigned counsel admitted that they
were negligent, incompetent, and remiss in their representation, a peti
tioner was denied relief because he failed to allege the specific acts
of the lawyers which constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
74
A petitioner successful in showing the incompetence of his
lawyer must also show that he was prejudiced by counsel's inadequacy
before relief will be granted. 5 By this standard, a lawyer who ad-
mitted token representation and who was asleep during the exami-
nation of a witness rendered effective representation, as it was held
that the testimony given during counsel's somnolence was not essen-
tial to the defense, 6 This reasoning may be criticized on the ground
that if the right to effective counsel is constitutionally guaranteed,
its denial should not be subjected to a prejudice or "harmless error"
"
t Hester v. United States, 303 F.2d 47 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 847 (1962);
accord, United States v. Baca, 451 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1971); Brady v. United States, 433
F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1970); People v. Pickett, 2 111. App.3d 560, 276 N.E.2d 751 (1971);
Turner v. State, 208 Kan. 865, 494 P.2d 1130 (1972); State v. Forsness, 495 P.2d 176
(Mont. 1972).
1 Interview with Hon. Herbert R. Whiting, Judge of The Court of Common Pleas of Cuya-
hoga County, Ohio, in Cleveland, Ohio, on July 25, 1972.
"Poole v- United States, 438 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1971); Slawek v. United States, 413 F.2d
957 (8th Cit. 1969); Kress v. United States, 411 F.2d 16 (8th Cit. 1969); State v. Moser,
78 N.M. 212, 430 P.2d 106 (1967).
73 Dayton v. United States, 319 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1963); O'Maliey v. United States, 285
F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961); Turner v. Cupp, 1 Or. App. 596, 465 P.2d 249 (1970); Com-
monwealth v. Reagan, 212 Pa. Super. 464, 243 A.2d 458 (1968).
t4 Gilpin v. United States, 252 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1958); accord, People v. Beagle, 6 Cal.3d
441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1971); People v. Saidi-Tabatabai, 7 Cal. App.3d
981, 86 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1970).
"SPeople v. Redman, 273 N.E.2d 639 (Ill. App. 1971); State v. Davidson, 252 Or. 617,
451 P.2d 481 (1969); Hero v. Cox, 212 Va. 644, 186 S.E.2d 85 (1972).
6United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970); accord, Pineda v. Craven, 327 F.
Supp. 1062 (N.D. Cal, 1971).
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standard. To excuse defense counsel's substandard performance of
his duty when there is no proof that the defendant's right to a fair
trial has been harmed is to dilute the strength of our adversary
system. 7 Some courts interpret the prejudice standard as requiring
that the defendant show that the outcome would have been different
but for counsel's incompetence 8 As even experienced lawyers hesi-
tate to indulge in speculations founded on the vagaries of a jury, it
seems folly to expect the defendant to do so unless it is to be in-
ferred that he is more adept at games of chance.
Standards on Appeal
Reviewing courts have steadfastly refused to consider an at-
torney's trial errors as grounds to set aside a conviction. Trial tactics
are considered the exclusive domain of the lawyer. Even though in
retrospect the lawyer's actions may appear to have been blunders,
they are defendable as an exercise of judgment. 9 Advocacy is a skill
so individualistic that it cannot be appraised accurately and fairly
in a post-mortem evaluation. To assert defects in the trial procedure
is not to show a denial of effective assistance of counsel, only
"perfect vision of hindsight."8 It is not considered ineffective rep-
resentation for a lawyer to fail to call or interview witnesses if he
believes their testimony would not assist in the defense 1 or to fail
to make appropriate motions if the lawyer has a reasonable basis
for his decision.
82
Counsel is not required to urge every defense or even to present
any defense at all if there is no defense which he intelligently and
in good faith believes to be supported by the facts.83 The extent of
the assigned lawyer's duty is to investigate the defense urged by
the defendant in order to make an informed judgment as to its
merits.U4 Yet it has been suggested that if the defendant is adamant,
"'Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (DC. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850
(1958).
78People v. Johnson, 45 111.2d 501, 259 N.E.2d 796 (1970); People v. Harper, 43 1ll.2d
368, 253 N.E.2d 451 (1969).
"United States v. Stoecker, 216 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1954); Patterson v. Slayton, 331 F. Supp.
564 (W.D. Va. 1971); Commonwealth v. Bates, 213 Pa Super. 71, 245 A.2d 708 (1968);
State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969).
0 Murgia v. United States, 448 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1971); accord, United States v. Matalon,
445 F.2d 1215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 853 (1971); Amecn v, State, 51 Wis. 2d
175, 186 N.W.2d 206 (1971).
81 Gray v. United States, 299 F,2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Winters v. Cook, 333 F. Supp.
1033 (N.D. Miss, 1971); McCall v. State, 257 S.C. 93, 184 S.E.2d 341 (1971).
82People v. McWilliams, 2 Ill. App.3d 776, 277 N.E.2d 726 (1972); Quinn v. State, 53
Wis.2d 821, 193 N.W.2d 665 (1972)-
"Reyes v. Cox, 336 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Va. 1971); People v. Massie, 66 Cal.2d 899, 428
P.2d 869, 59 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967); People v. Ross, 268 Cal. App.2d 525, 74 Cal. Rptr.
99 (1969).
"United States v Main, 443 F.2d 900 (9th Cir.), uerl. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971);
Crowe v. State, 194 N.W.2d 234 (S.D. 1972); ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
DR 6- 101 (A) (3) (1969).
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counsel should urge even frivolous defenses. 5 However, the lawyer
is the tactician of the case and generally the only trial decisions in
which the will of the defendant must prevail are whether to plead
guilty, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify."
Where trial counsel's failure to present a substantial and avail-
able defense is the result of neglect or ignorance rather than a de-
liberate exercise of judgment, an allegation of ineffective represen-
tation has been upheld. 7 In instances where counsel is unable to
present an adequate defense because defendant resolutely rejects
counsel's attempts to communicate and refuses to co-operate, a con-
viction may be set aside even though the defendant has prevented
effective assistance of counsel." However, if the defendant is not
so thoroughly recalcitrant as to prevent any defense at all, relief will
be denied as the indigent has no right to assigned counsel with whom
he agrees.'9
The court has been willing to find a lack of effective represen-
tation where defense counsel is intoxicated or physically or mentally
ill on the theory that a lawyer in this condition is incapable of pro-
viding effective representation.9 It is this theory of incapacity which
has been extended to include circumstances where counsel's lack of
knowledge precluded an informed judgment as to the defense. 1 Even
then, the defendant has the burden of proving both lack of knowl-
edge and prejudice resulting therefrom.2 Should a lawyer be so un-
wittingly truthful as to admit that his lack of knowledge was the
85 State v. Smith, 43 N.J. 67, 202 A.2d 669 (1964), cort. denied, 379 U.S. 1005, rob. denied,
380 U.S. 938 (1965). However, a lawyer's presentation of a frivolous defense might be
considered a violation of ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7 -4 (1969).
86 Martinez v. People, 480 P.2d 843 (Colo. 1971) (dictum); see People v. Phelps, 51 1ll.2d
35, 280 N.E.2d 203 (1972).
07Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967); People v, Rhoden, 6 Cal.3d 519, 492
P.2d 1143, 99 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1972); People v. McDowell, 69 Cal.2d 737, 447 P.2d 97,
73 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
88 Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cit. 1970); People v. Moss, 253 Cal. App.2d 248,
61 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1967).
'"United States v. Parhms, 424 F.2d 152 (9th Cit.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970);
Shaw v. United States, 403 F.2d 528 (8th Cit. 1968); Hughes v, State, 228 Ga. 593, 187
S.E.2d 135 (1972); People v. Smith, 50 Ill.2d 229, 278 N.E.2d 73 (1972); State v.
Rinaldi, 58 N.J. Super. 209, 156 A.2d 28 (1959), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 914 (1961).
"United States ex rel. Freeley v. Ragan, 166 F-2d 976 (7th Cit. 1964) (by implication);
Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1944), rert. denied, 324 U.S. 874 (1945);
Franklin v. State, 471 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. 1971); People v. Davis, 48 Cal.2d 241, 309 P.2d
1 (1957); State v. Keller, 57 N.D. 645, 223 N.W. 698 (1929), noted in 64 Al..R. 434;
cf. Leeper v. State, 472 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1971). But cf. United States ex rel.
Skinner v. Robinson, 105 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Ill. 1952).
"Bruhaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962); Thomas v. State, 251 Ind. 546, 242
N.E.2d 919 (1969),
zPeople v. Armenta, 22 Cal. App.3d 823, 99 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1972); People v. Gonzales,
40 II.2d 233, 239 N.E.2d 783 (1968); see Childs v. Cardwell, 452 F.2d 521 (6th Cit.
1971); cf. State v. Cutcher, 17 Ohio App.2d 107, 244 N.E.2d 767 (1969).
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result of his willful failure to investigate, both the indigent and his
assigned lawyer will be given a hearing."3
In instances where the facts and circumstances indicate that an
appeal would probably be successful, counsel's failure to file an appeal
or his failure to raise any meritorious arguments on appeal consti-
tutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 4 Further, it is the defendant's
right to decide whether or not to appeal a conviction, and a lawyer
desiring to withdraw from an appeal he considers frivolous must
file a brief in favor of any supportable claim?5 The lawyer's motion
to withdraw will be granted only if the court concludes that the
arguments are completely without factual basis?6 This seems to be
an exercise in futility, as an appeal could hardly be considered friv-
olous if it were possible to raise any meritorious argument.
Dissatisfaction with Privately Retained Counsel
Lest it appear that the possibility of relief for lack of effective
assistance of counsel is chimerical for the indigent represented by
assigned counsel, it should be noted that the defendant who retains
counsel is in a greater predicament. Appropriating the agency theory,
the court has held that the defendant who employs counsel has
acquiesced in the incompetent performance of his lawyer by his fail-
ure to object in open court." It may be argued that the agency theory
is misapplied in instances where the "principal" may be ignorant of
his constitutional rights and unacquainted with legal proceedings
and therefore relies on the advice of his "agent." A defendant, who
petitioned for post-conviction relief on the ground that he was de-
prived of effective assistance of counsel when his retained lawyer
failed to file an appeal, was denied relief.'8 The court reasoned that
it was not obliged to ensure adequate representation as defendant had
given no notice that he was indigent and entitled to the benefits and
privileges of such status. Only a few progressive decisions have
"Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1968).
"4Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Gregory v. United States, 446 F.2d 498 (5th
Cir. 1971); Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. App. 1963); People v, Lampkins, 21
NY.2d 138, 233 N.E.2d 849, 286 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1967)
AsAnders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, reb. denied, 388 U.S. 924 (1967); People v. Bradford,
3 III. App.3d 81, 279 N.E.2d 34 (1971).
96Hollie v. State, 256 So.2d 42 (Fla. App. 1971); People v. Carr, 3 Ill. App.3d 227, 278
N.E.2d 839 (1971). An argument that punching the prosecutor in the nose in open court
was not direct contempt of court would be frivolous.
W"Kennedy v. United States, 259 F.2d 883 (th Ciu. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 994
(1959); Tompsetr v, Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944); Rankins v. State, 254 So.2d 355
(Ala. Cr. App. 1971); People v. Underhill, 38 Ill.2d 245, 230 N.E.2d 837 (1967), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 912 (1968); People v. Strader, 23 Ill.2d 13, 177 N.E.2d 126 (1961).
9tEx parte Kallie, 475 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Cr. App. 1971); accord, Johnson v. Common.
wealth, 473 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. App. 1971).
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recognized that the constitutional right to the effective assistance
of counsel extends to those who pay for their representation as well
as to those represented by assigned counsel29
Conclusion
Effective assistance of counsel is a prerequisite to a conviction
in a society which assumes that justice alone is insufficient to satisfy
the constitutional mandate, It is essential that the rights of the in-
dividual be protected through a vigorous adversary system. The
writer believes that the most effective and efficient representation
would be provided through the implementation of a Public Defender
program equipped with investigative services, providing lawyers
experienced in criminal trials, and unencumbered with the necessity
of obtaining a fee.
A restriction of the right to effective representation through the
application of a rigid standard on review is inappropriate. The right
should not be conditioned on a showing of prejudice nor should it be
burdened with an occasionally unwarranted presumption of the com-
petence of court-appointed counsel. Appellate attorneys have not been
so hesitant to denounce their fellow lawyers through a hindsight
view of trial performance and the court likewise should abandon its
outmoded squeamishness. A lawyer is required to assist in maintain-
ing the integrity and competence of the legal profession.0 Is it not
unreasonable to expect the court to co-operate in this endeavor.
The Court in Powell has clearly proclaimed the right to effective
representation but has defined "effective" only in vague and nebulous
terms. The multitude of petitions for post-conviction relief alleging
incompetency of counsel may threaten the efficient administration
of criminal justice, but they cannot come as a complete surprise. A
petition asserting ineffective assistance of counsel is rarely granted
a hearing, much less a new trial or relief, and any decrease in the
number of complaints could well be the result of the petitioner's
recognition of the hopelessness of relief. The indigent is not likely to
be satisfied with any representation which results in incarceration,
even though his guilt is irrebuttable. The endless processing of these
petitions is a time consuming and expensive placebo by which a
public comforts itself that the rights of the individual have been
protected. The interpretation of "effective assistance of counsel"
should be elucidated with greater precision so that the indigent can
comprehend the extent of his right and appellate decisions will re-
"Arabtia v. United StaLs, 455 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1972); Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108
(7th Cir. 1957); State v, Rushord, 127 Vt. 105, 241 A.2d 306 (1968); see Wilson v.
Phend, 417 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1969).
"' ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS No. 1 (1969).
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fleet greater uniformity as to when there has been a deprivation of
the right.
In the past decade the procedures through which a lack of
effective representation may be asserted have been developed and
extended, but the indigent entitled to this representation remains a
theoretical individual. If his satisfaction with his lawyer is of con-
cern, a more realistic appraisal of the indigent is long overdue. It
may be that the indigent fails to perceive the extent of his right to
effective counsel because this right has no parallel in his milieu. The
indigent's arrest is the product of a government's police vigilance.
His conviction appears to be the goal of a trenchant government
prosecutor. It is difficult for the indigent to believe that the govern-
ment also will provide a lawyer committed to preventing an adjudi-
cation of his guilt, or at least to reducing the penalty. Having acquired
no possessory right to his lawyer's dedication by the payment of a
fee, the prisoner awaiting trial derisively refers to his assigned
attorney as a "state's lawyer." 101 The indigent is familiar with an
adversary system played in earnest for survival or the spoils where
success is the sole criterion of fair play. How can he fully compre-
hend the sportsmanlike adversary system of the judicial process with
its intricate procedural rules?
Neither his assigned counsel nor the judicial process is single-
handedly responsible for the indigent's imprisonment, but his only
alternatives are to serve his term in the penitentiary, to exercise his
right to appeal, or to attack the conviction collaterally. The indigent
has multiple dissatisfactions which often coalesce in a harangue
against the lawyer who failed to obtain his acquittal. He has com-
plex sociological needs which he cannot effectively isolate from his
legal difficulties. When a legal process which is limited to the attain-
ment of justice and the protection of inherent rights results in in-
carceration, it should then operate in concert with more merciful
agencies. Social service workers, educators, psychologists, and em-
ployers can more adequately satisfy non-legal needs than can a judicial
system which adjudges guilt and imposes penalties. These agencies
should be available in the penitentiary. One beneficial side effect of
their efforts could be a reduction in the number of petitions for relief
on the ground of ineffective representation. Society's obligation to
one of its members who has failed to adapt to society's standards
cannot be satisfied solely through a legal system even though that
system protects substantive rights through efficient procedural means.
Mary Sue Langt
0 Interview, Hurley, supra note 52.
" Third year student, The Cleveland State University College of Iaw.
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